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"FREEDOM FROM UNREAL LOYALTIES": ON
FIDELITY IN CONSTITUTIONAL
INTERPRETATION'
Catharine A. MacKinnon
T O briefly consider the normative question, does the Constitution
deserve our fidelity, I will ask of the Constitution the question
Rousseau asked of the inequality he observed around him: "What can
make it legitimate?"2 In so doing, I decline the invitation to theorize
morally, meaning to pontificate on what I feel, and therefore "we"
should think, is good and bad. This is not my project, nor is my pro-
ject a disguised version of that project.
In the process, I sketch an approach to the Constitution that pro-
vides an alternative to Ronald Dworkin's "moral reading," one like
his centered on the equality question, but more descriptively accurate
of constitutional process and less elitist and exclusionary in method
and content. I hope to show that the fidelity I practice is not what
Jack Balkin has warned us against in any of its guises, yet is a reading
of the Constitution-an aggressive reading, but a reading nonetheless.
This reading stands against moralism, constitutional or otherwise.
The moralism criticized here3 is evident in Balkin's discussion of "con-
1. Virginia Woolf, in Three Guineas, explains how an organization of women that
she imagines would both criticize and recreate institutions:
By criticizing education they would help to create a civilized society which
protects culture and intellectual liberty. By criticizing religion they would
attempt to free the religious spirit from its present servitude and would help,
if need be, to create a new religion based it might well be upon the New
Testament, but, it might well be, very different from the religion now erected
upon that basis. And in all this... they would be helped... by their position
as outsiders, that freedom from unreal loyalties, that freedom from
interested motives which are at present assured them by the State.
Virginia Woolf, Three Guineas (1938), reprinted in A Room of One's Own and Three
Guineas 107, 234 (The Hogarth Press 1984) (emphasis added). Note that it is the
insiders who have the "interested motives." Id
A conversation with Jed Rubenfeld encouraged the shape of this Response. Com-
ments by Cass Sunstein and Martha Nussbaum helped clarify it. Representing my
Bosnian and Croatian clients, survivors of the Serbian genocide, with Natalie Nenadic
and Asja Armanda has deepened my understanding of accountability.
2. This is how I translate Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Du Contrat social 153, 160 (Le
Livre de Poche 1978) (1762) ("Qu'est-ce qui peut le rendre ldgitime?").
3. I am not condemning all moral theory by taking Ronald Dworkin's particular
approach to it as all there is. I do criticize the kind of moral theory he engages in,
some features of which, while perhaps extreme in his work, exemplify tendencies
common to much, if not all, moral philosophy.
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stitutional evil,",4 his "really bad stuff."5 I am not saying those things
are good. Rather, the main problem Balkin seeks to solve, as I read
his paper, is not a problem I have. He is conflicted over faith to a
document that originally considered the ancestors of my colleagues
and friends to be three-fifths of a person, to be bought and sold as
"property."6 Then, after keeping people like me from practicing law
because we were not fully "persons," and, after strictly scrutinizing
for racism, locking up the family of my colleagues and friends in con-
centration camps for racial reasons, this same document arrives today
at a point where my colleagues and friends can still be bought and
sold, this time as "speech."9 I am not torn over fidelity to that docu-
ment. Behind the angst over infidelity in Jack's engaging paper lurks
an identification with the Constitution that masks a deeper identifica-
tion with those who have authoritatively interpreted it. This identifi-
cation, I do not share; I do not recognize myself, or feel my power
implicated in, the "we" of his discussion.
To state this directly, no one asked women about the Constitution.
We never consented to it. This, I take it, is, or should be, a big legiti-
macy problem. The so-called "majoritarian premise" of the Constitu-
tion so widely invoked, including by Ronald Dworkin,10 began by
assuming about fifty-three percent of the population out. Add to this
the excluded male slaves then, men of color now, non-property own-
ers then, poor people now, and what is left of the majority in the
premise? It refers to the holders of the majority of power, an elite, a
tiny minority. Why should I be torn between loyalty to them and
other loyalties? 1
At risk of oversimplification, contrast two dramatically divergent
accounts of constitutional interpretation to explain why the location I
am claiming produces constitutional fidelity. In account one, Ronald
4. J.M. Balkin, Agreements with Hell and Other Objects of Our Faith, 65 Fordham
L. Rev. 1703, 1706 (1997).
5. J.M. Balkin, Symposium, Fidelity in Constitutional Theory, Fordham Univer-
sity School of Law 127 (Sept. 21, 1996) (transcript on file with the Fordham Law
Review).
6. Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 343, 404-12 (1856); see Patricia J. Williams, On Be-
ing the Object of Property, 14 Signs: J. Women in Culture & Soc'y 5, 5-6 (1988) (slave
ancestors of Professor Williams).
7. Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 139-42 (1873) (Bradley, J.,
concurring).
8. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 217-19 (1944); see, e.g., Charles R.
Lawrence III & Mar J. Matsuda, We Won't Go Back: Making the Case for Affirma-
tive Action at xvi (1997) (internment of Professor Matsuda's Okinawan family mem-
bers during World War II).
9. American Booksellers Ass'n, Inc. v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985) (por-
nography harms women but is protected speech), affd, 475 U.S. 1132 (1986) (sum-
mary affrmance).
10. Ronald Dworkin, Freedom's Law: The Moral Reading of the American Con-
stitution 1-38 (1996) [hereinafter Dworkin, Freedom's Law].
11. See Woolf, supra note 1, at 234, on "unreal loyalties."
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Dworkin floats above social life, transcending it, accompanied by Her-
bert Wechsler."u He sees words in the Constitution. He reads
Supreme Court opinions. He thinks. He theorizes. He decides what
is good and bad. He distills principles by sanitizing value judgments to
the point where no one's name is discernible on them. He says: This
is good. He sees how particular facts-a gritty, low-level notion not in
much use-fit under what he calls principles. Through this "top
down" approach to constitutional interpretation, he pronounces what
is faithful to the Constitution and what violates it.
An alternative: You walk through life, this life. You notice some
people-sometimes you, your colleagues, your friends-systemati-
cally treated worse than others. It is actually rather hard to miss.
People tell you what happens to them. You remember what they tell
you and who they are. You try to make sense of what has been done
to them. Nobody needs to be told that there is a problem here, be-
cause you deny neither the equality of these people nor the inequality
imposed on them. You and they want to end it. You remember that
there is, supposedly, "no caste here," 3 no second class citizens under
the Constitution.
So a conflict is posed: Does the Constitution permit the practices
you have encountered? It does in reality: here is the Constitution,
and here are these practices being done. Do you give up on the Con-
stitution, in a crisis of faith, ceasing to believe in God because there is
evil in the world? Or do you decide to hold the Constitution to its
promise, for the first time if necessary? If you take this "bottom up"
approach, it is not because you believe in the Constitution, although
you might, but because you believe in the equality of your people, and
you are not going to let the Constitution make them less.
Gradually you articulate the equality principle in terms of ending
the inequality you see. You know that those who interpreted the Con-
stitution before you did not see it the way you do, but you never allow
them to think that they cannot understand what you are saying-no
fancy epistemological dodges. They may not have come to see what
you see on their own, unaided, but they can sure get their minds
around it now.
Gradually you learn that inequality, as lived, keeps people down
because of who they are. You decide that if constitutional equality
does not mean ending this, it does not mean anything at all. Nobody
says you are wrong about that, that the equality principle really per-
mits denigrating subordinated groups, supports trafficking human
flesh, imposes inferior status. Then one day you find Ronald Dworkin
is trying to get in your way.
12. See Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73
Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1959).
13. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting); see Cass
R. Sunstein, The Anticoste Principle, 92 Mich. L. Rev. 2410 (1994).
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Using the "bottom up" approach to illuminate the "top down" one
clarifies some otherwise murky issues in the fidelity discussion. Con-
sider first the confusion between what would be good to encompass in
constitutional equality and what equality means. Arguing that a prac-
tice is unconstitutionally unequal is not the same as arguing that it is a
bad thing in the moral sense. Many things are no doubt bad, but only
being part of systematic subordination on a group basis makes some-
thing unequal. Bad things may or may not be unconstitutional, but
unequal things are.'4 Expanding the standards for cognizable inequal-
ity by getting new groups and practices recognized under the Consti-
tution is interpretation. If expanding the meaning of a constitutional
term like "equal protection of the laws" to prohibit the reality of sec-
ond class citizenship of formerly excluded peoples is regarded as a
rather large interpretive step by some, it may be because those doing
the interpretation want to keep their practices and privileges, or have
limited imaginations or narrow lives. But we are still talking interpre-
tation: what is and is not inequality. We are not talking what it would
be good to be against: the task of moral theory and legislation.
Take, as an example, the question whether sexual harassment vio-
lates the equality principle. Before, it did not. Now it does, by inter-
pretation.' 5 That was not done by arguing that sexual harassment is a
bad thing. It was done by arguing that sexual harassment is sex dis-
crimination. Consider how to argue that acts that are already suppos-
edly considered bad and criminal, like rape, are also constitutional
inequalities. Not by arguing that being raped by state actors is a bad
thing; by arguing that being raped by state actors is a distinctively fe-
male form of second class citizenship, gendered injustice. That rape is
bad does not make it unequal or gendered. That rape is sex-based
violation which, when officially allowed, deprives citizens of their
rights to equal protection of the laws, does. 6 That rape is bad is not
an argument of constitutional interpretation; that rape is a practice of
gender inequality is.
My point here is, moralism is not interpretive as a matter of
method. Moralism asks, is rape bad, is sexual harassment wrong. This
14. This assumes, of course, other requisites are met, like state action but also
provides a basis for interrogating them.
15. Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64-67 (1986) (sexual harass-
ment is sex discrimination under Title VII); Bohen v. City of E. Chicago, 799 F.2d
1180, 1185 (7th Cir. 1986) (sexual harassment is sex discrimination under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983).
16. The subtext of this discussion is United States v. Lanier, 73 F.3d 1380 (6th Cir.
1996) (sexual assault convictions of judge prosecuted under substantive due process
liberty theory reversed on grounds that such a right is not clearly defined for purposes
of 18 U.S.C. § 242). See Brief Amicus Curiae for Vivian Forsythe-Archie and the Na-
tional Coalition Against Sexual Assault, United States v. Lanier, 116 S. Ct. 2522
(1996) (No. 95-1717) (granting cert.) (arguing that sexual assault by judge of litigants
and employees violates well-defined sex equality rights), available in LEXIS, Genfed
library, USPlus file.
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is not a question of constitutional interpretation. The Constitution
does not prohibit the bad and the wrong. It does prohibit the unequal.
Even being really bad does not make rape and sexual harassment une-
qual; being based on sex does. Certainly, whether rape or sexual har-
assment is wrong is an important question, and denial that sexual
harassment or rape is wrong or harmful is involved in any adjudication
of it. I actually think that what is wrong with rape is inextricable from
what is unequal about it. Meaning, if men were raped equally with
women, which I am not recommending, I might even get interested in
what is wrong with rape apart from its inequality. But so long as sex-
ual assault violates women as women and keeps them inferior, it is an
act of inequality, by interpretation.
Another confusion in Ronald Dworkin's work, and in Jack Balkin's
also, concerns the matter of internal and external standards for valida-
tion of an interpretation. In their view, it seems that having external
standards for interpretational validity is a form of infidelity. They
tend to assume that you are faithful to the Constitution only if you can
validate your interpretation of it by standards that are wholly internal
to the document itself.
G6del showed that internal standards for validation do not work in
mathematics, 7 and we are unlikely, in a social discipline like law, to
do better on this score. Besides, law is supposed to have its feet in the
world. It is not supposed to be a closed system, a set of abstract postu-
lates and empty axioms from which determinate conclusions are de-
duced. The best thing about the legal process, particularly the
common law, is that, within principled limits, it is open to reality. Cer-
tainly it is muscle-bound with power, resistant to change, status quo
and status driven, but it is still also fact based, where people live. To
require that only internal standards validate interpretation method-
ologically excludes from the system its most democratic, least solipsis-
tic, and most creative feature. Legal change comes from life, not from
the brow of moral readers.
In the "moral reading," interpretation is also, in a sense, literary."8
I used to think that it was my criticism of law professors that they
acted as if law were a novel. The fact is, law isn't fiction, folks. With
all respect to the real world clout of literature, heads roll in legal
cases, and I don't think it's a virtue called "principle" to position your-
self to transcend that. There is no virtue in adjudicating child custody
cases to better develop character and plot-it makes a better story
17. Kurt G6del, On Formally Undecidable Propositions of Principia Mathematica
and Related Systems I, in 1 Kurt G~del: Collected Works 145, 145-95 (Solomon
Feferman ed., 1986); see Ernest Nagel & James R Newman, Gtdel's Proof 26-36
(1958). Reading Nagel and Newman's chapter 3 on "Absolute Proofs of Consis-
tency," paralleling "the Constitution" to "mathematics" and "constitutional interpre-
tation" to "meta-mathematics," illustrates this point.
18. Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire 228-38 (1986) [hereinafter Dworkin, Law's
Empire] (law as chain novel).
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about "the best interests of the child" to give little Samantha to
Daddy even though he is sexually abusing her. Deciding that law is
something this "we" makes up, some collective story by its high theo-
rists, takes authorship from people's lives. Law does not need more of
this.
So how is my view of interpretation principled? Because equality is
not, pace "the moral reader," an abstraction, my equality principle is
thick with reality, yet principled.19 As it happens, the actual constitu-
tional process of equality adjudication has been more open to reality
than the "moral reading" appears to be. Courts are a great deal less
afraid of substantivity than some who theorize equality out of court-
and courts hold themselves faithful to a text. Some courts, who prac-
tice interpretation while preaching it, understand that legal principles
animated by life can still be principled-indeed, their closeness to re-
ality, precisely their thickness, may be much of their principle.
My view also faces the fact that social location and accountability-
who you are and who you answer to-are central to interpretation. A
legal interpreter has to be all people at all times in all places and social
positions before his reading qualifies as "the moral reading." With all
respect to Ronald Dworkin's immortal stature, this is impossible. Not
only is no one this person, no one can do it, and trying denies reality
and validates power.2 0 Would our floating everyone, the no one in
particular who is capable of the "moral reading," have known what
was wrong with Dred Scott in 1857? This reader knows that sexual
harassment is a practice of inequality today,21 but would he have
known it before the courts did? Forgive me if I doubt it, given that
"the moral reader" today, along with law today, tells us that women
can be bought and sold as sex called speech and constitutional equal-
ity is troubled not at all. 2 The "moral reading" of equality knows
only what power has already been brought to concede. If this is con-
stitutional fidelity, count me an adulterer.
Observe that, in the discussion of whether the Constitution deserves
fidelity, equality is not just as an artifact or a convenient example.
Equality keeps coming up not only because it is a dynamic doctrine
with big interpretive shifts, or because the mainstream equality idea
about sameness and difference also animates legal method's reasoning
by analogy and distinction, making equality law a fair stand-in for law
itself. The reason is that equality makes the Constitution legitimate,
so its treatment is central to answering the question of why we should
19. ld. at 381 (stating the "abstract principle" of equality as he understands it); id.
at 296 ("Government, we say, has an abstract responsibility to treat each citizen's fate
as equally important.").
20. On why the objective stance supports power, see Catharine A. MacKinnon,
Toward a Feminist Theory of the State 162-63, 231-34 (1989).
21. Dworkin, Freedom's Law, supra note 10, at 234.
22. Id at 216-23, 233-39 (ballistic discussion of civil rights approach to
pornography).
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be loyal to it. Equality comes up in the fidelity discussion precisely
because, to the degree the Constitution is not equal, it is not legiti-
mate, hence not deserving of adherence, so it becomes unacceptable
merely to interpret it.
I am saying, if there were no equality guarantee in the Constitution,
or in the fundamental understandings with which it is interpreted, I
would be trying to get one in. Would that make me faithless? I do
know I could not work in the position of interpretation I do now, a
luxury I owe to those who got equality in there in the first place, be-
cause there would be no equality to interpret. And I would have less
faith in a Constitution that would deserve less.
The Constitution became more legitimate the day it guaranteed
equal protection of the laws. It will become more legitimate the day it
delivers on this promise. It became more legitimate the day it prohib-
ited facial sex discrimination by interpretation. It will become more
legitimate the day it recognizes that discrimination against gays and
lesbians in all its forms is unequal. It will be more legitimate still the
day it interprets its other amendments in light of a serious equality
guarantee, so that just as no one's slavery can be someone else's prop-
erty, no one's slavery can be someone else's speech.
Lawyers think we have to legitimate our legal arguments by assert-
ing that all we ask of law is interpretation. My point is that, in a de-
mocracy, the Constitution also has to legitimate itself with people, and
as to women it has quite a lot to answer for. In this sense, fidelity, in
law as in life, is a relationship, a two-way street: Our fidelity to the
Constitution is bound up with its fidelity to us.
The last concrete discussion that I was around for of what is inter-
pretation and therefore a reading, thus faithful, versus what is im-
ported or made up or brought in or effectively legislated, therefore
lacking faith-in Jack Balkin's terms, what is "on the table" or "off-
the-wall"23-was whether the Fourteenth Amendment could or would
expand to provide sex equality, or whether we needed an Equal
Rights Amendment ("E.R.A."), saying in so many words that women
are constitutionally equal. The question remains whether a Constitu-
tion that does not facially guarantee women's equality deserves wo-
men's fidelity. The Constitution is less legitimate today than on the
day E.R.A. becomes part of it. Women cannot get full equal rights,
nor does the Constitution deserve their faith, to the degree it would if
E.R.A. were there. Until that day, women's equality is less legitimate
in constitutional interpretation, but the Constitution is also less legiti-
mate from women's point of view. And where is democratic legiti-
macy grounded, in people or texts?
I think that an equality mandate requires refusing to reflect back to
the law the limits its powerful interpreters have set on the lives of the
23. Balkdn, supra note 4, at 1704, 1729.
1997] 1779
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
unequal, and seeing instead your own face in terms that reflect you
whole-terms like citizen, like person. To interpret an equality guar-
antee faithfully is to embody this aspiration in law and society. If it is
instrumentalism or consequentialism, as opposed to principled, to care
about the outcome of this process, then call what I do something other
than principled. Alternatively, show me someone who is indifferent to
the human consequences of their principles, and I will show you some-
one who is in great need of what the word integrity implies.'
Fidelity in this view is not about the constitutional equivalent of "do
you believe in God?" It begins with asking "who are your people?"
It requires finding those to whom you are accountable. You can listen
to everyone, be in dialogue with everyone, be fair-minded to every-
one, but you cannot be equally accountable to everyone at once in an
unequal world. This perspective reframes the fidelity question as a
lawyer's question I have long wanted to ask "the moral reader": Who
do you represent?
24. Dworkin, Law's Empire, supra note 18, at 225-75 (law as integrity).
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